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Introduction 
 
Scholars have long recognized the exceptional power of identity in the Middle East and 
the permeability of regional states to trans-state identity discourses (Salloukh 2004). 
Barnett (1993) and Lynch (1999) argued that identity is shaped by discourse 
competition in a trans-state public space and, once constructed, it shapes actors’ 
conceptions of their interests and generates norms that constrain their conduct. In the 
regional states system, rival states bid for hegemony using trans-state discourses 
(Kienle 1990; Hinnebusch 2013); and the main threats against which many regimes 
balance has not been foreign armies but subversion challenging their domestic 
legitimacy in the name of norms derived from identity (Gause 2003-04). Identity, 
therefore, matters but what is new today is the unprecedented surge of sectarian 
identity across the region. Instead of inclusive Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic identities, rival 
states and movements now exploit the highly divisive sectarian dichotomy between 
Sunni and Shia.  
 What explains this rapid diffusion and apparent hegemony of sectarian discourse 
and practices across the region? This paper will survey the accumulation of factors 
behind the sectarian surge and argue that it is chiefly the outcome of the state failures 
brought about by the Arab spring: first, state failures have greatly intensified power 
struggles within states and across the region in which sectarianism has been 
instrumentalized; and second, such failures have greatly intensified pre-existing 
permeability of states, amplifying mechanisms of diffusion, from emulation to 
intervention.  
 
Explaining Sectarian Diffusion: From Banal Sectarianism to Sectarian Bi-
Polarization 
There are multiple identities in the Middle East, located at sub-state (communal 
minorities, tribes), state and trans/supra-state (Pan Arabism, Pan-Islam) levels and the 
dominant identity has changed over time. Sectarianism is only one possible identity and 
is not an undifferentiated phenomenon (Haddad 2011). So what explains its increasing 
hegemony across the region?  
 
Instrumentalization of Banal Sectarianism 
 Sectarianism is rooted at the micro-level individual/group. This everyday (or 
banal) sectarianism is an un-politicized identity marker in multi-communal societies 
compatible with sectarian co-existence and with broader identities (e.g. Arabism). The 
first step toward sectarianization is its politicization. This may be a function of the 
increased competition for scarce resources accompanying modernization, especially in 
times of rapid population growth and increases in the educated unemployed; when 
many resources are state distributed, political entrepreneurs are incentivized to use 
sectarianism to mobilize sects in intrastate competition over resources, as famously in 
Lebanon and individuals to use sectarianism to gain access to clientele networks. This 
“instrumental sectarianism” has little doctrinal implications or necessary 
incompatibility with sectarian coexistence.  
 Sectarianism’s use in authoritarian regime building in MENA’s multi-sectarian 
societies further politicized it: patrimonial practices such as reliance on trusted 
sectarians to foster cohesive ruling groups, as in Syria and Iraq, was a common practice, 
but it was also balanced by cross-sectarian co-optation of wider social forces, via 
bureaucratic institutions. Many authoritarian regimes, therefore, both used and 
contained sectarianism. However, where inclusionary practices eroded, the excluded, 
feeling themselves victims of sectarian discrimination, might well embrace a sectarian 
counter-identity, as was particularly the case in Syria and Iraq. But such 
sectarianization was by no means inevitable or particularly widespread; the system 
seemed self-reproducing and required external intervention to set off the 
destabilization of multi-sectarian states.  
  
Precipitating the Sectarian Struggle: From Global Intrusion to the New Arab Cold War 
 The current sectarianization is a recent phenomenon precipitated by the 
unprecedented intrusion of the U.S. global hegemon into the regional power struggle. 
The destruction of the Iraqi state amidst massive violence (shock and awe) unleashed 
Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq. The United States constructed a replacement political 
system that institutionalized sectarianism. This failed state provided a congenial space 
for international jihadists, including al-Qaeda, to stir up sectarianism by targeting Shia 
mosques. It also allowed for intense penetration of Iraq by Iranian backed Iraqi Shia 
exiles and by anti-Shia jihadists transiting through Syria – an unprecedented 
transnationalization of sectarian conflict. The Iraq conflict spilled over in the region by 
stimulating sectarian discourse in the trans-state media.  
 Moreover, the empowering of Iranian-linked Iraqi Shia movements alarmed the 
Sunni Gulf powers, which fought back by instrumentalizing sectarianism. This resulted 
in what has been called the “New Arab Cold War,” which polarized the regional system 
in the 2000s between two rival camps – framed as the pro-Western Moderate Sunni 
bloc (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan) and the Resistance Axis (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, 
Hamas – fighting over sectarian-divided Lebanon and Iraq and divided over the Israeli 
wars against Hezbollah and Gaza. In the latter, the resistance camp, portraying its rivals 
as siding with Israel, won the war for public opinion. The moderate bloc fought back by 
portraying the issue as Shiite Iran’s interference in the Arab world against Sunnis. King 
Abdullah of Jordan famously warned of a “Shia Crescent.” Despite this, sectarianism 
found little resonance on the Arab street where Nasrallah, Assad and Ahmadinejad were 
the most popular regional leaders for their resistance to what was still seen as the main 
enemy, Israel (Valbjørn and Bank 2011). At the elite level though, the power struggle 
came to be perceived in sectarian zero-sum terms, destroying the tradition of inter-Arab 
compromise under which (since the end of the first Arab Cold War) regimes had 
refrained from attacking the others’ vital interests.  
 
The Arab Uprising: from revolt to civil war and grassroots sectarianization:  
 The Arab uprising further intensified the struggle for power. Once regimes were 
challenged, they instrumentalized sectarianism. In Syria, Iraq and Bahrain elites’ use of 
sectarianism to consolidate their support bases provoked counter-sectarianism among 
oppositions. Unlike in the 2000s, this instrumentalization of sectarianism found wide 
resonance in Arab societies for several reasons.  
 First, civil wars during which unrestrained violence was deployed in a zero-sum 
power struggle, turned fighters on both sides to jihadist versions of sectarianism. 
Jihadism is incompatible with sectarian coexistence, because it seeks to impose, if 
necessary by force, its one true interpretation of Islam in the public sphere, demonizing 
those who do not comply as infidels, and embracing martyrdom for the cause. Unlike an 
instrumentalist pursuit of material goods, which can be compromised by adjusting 
shares among the contenders, public religious visions cannot readily be compromised 
(Brubaker 2015).  
 Second, as civil wars led to state failure, notably in the Levant, the renewed 
permeability of states borders allowed Salafist jihadists to intervene on one side and a 
counter-coalition of Shia led minorities (hilf al-aqalliyyat) on the other. There was an 
unprecedented movement of foreign Muslim fighters into disputed states, while militias 
from one country, recruited via long-distance sectarian networks, regularly intervened 
in neighbouring countries, propelling an unprecedented transnationalization of 
opposing sectarian movements and networks. 
 Third, the security dilemma pushed all sides to fall back on their communal 
group for protection; this, combined with sectarian cleansing and intensely sectarian 
discourse in the satellite and social media, entrenched sectarianism at the grassroots of 
many Arab societies.  
 
Competitive Interference and Sectarian Proxy Wars:  
 In parallel, the Arab uprising reshuffled the cards in the regional power struggle 
of the 2000s, as state failures created vacuums inviting competitive external 
intervention in which rival powers provided arms and financing to bring sectarian-
affiliated allies to power in uprising states. Notably Syria, the linchpin of the resistance 
axis, became an arena of competitive intervention, since all sides perceived that the 
outcome of this “New Struggle for Syria” would tilt the regional power balance in favour 
of one or the other of the rival camps (Hinnebusch 2015).  
 Sectarian discourses became the main currency of the new identity wars. 
Sectarianism in its jihadist version is a particularly powerful instrument for subverting 
rival regimes, since it combines a sub-state character – the existence of grassroots 
communities within a state into which people are born – with the transnational 
networks to mobilize supporters across borders. As the rival regional powers backed 
the most sectarian factions – because they were the best fighters – the latter came to 
enjoy greater resources, precipitating a “bandwagoning” of more “moderate” factions to 
the jihadist poles, further exacerbating sectarianism.  
 States had unequal advantages when playing the new sectarian power game. 
Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, with historical identities relatively congruent with their 
borders and commanding the material resources to co-opt populations, create large 
security forces, and establish administrative structures over their territory, were more 
capable of making their borders impermeable to subversion. Their use of sectarianism 
in the regional struggle strengthened internal support (despite a risk of blowback, e.g. 
when Saudi Arabia’s export of Wahhabism helped create a threat to it in the form of 
ISIS). Their trans-state ideological appeal was fostered by superior command of satellite 
media and financial resources, arms transfers and territorial safe havens enabling their 
competitive intervention.  
 By contrast, the most identity-fragmented states (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, 
Bahrain) were victims of the new power struggle. Sectarianism polarized their 
populations, opposition was framed in sectarian terms and regimes relied more on 
defensive sectarian asabiyyeh (solidarity). Their often-arbitrarily constructed borders, 
which cut across identity groups and generated irredentism, made them more 
permeable to trans-state media, networks and movements and – to the extent they 
experienced state failure and were unable to defend their borders – they were magnets 
attracting proxy wars. While they had been players when regional rivalry focused on 
interpretations of Arab nationalism, sectarianization knocked them out of the game. 
  Each intervening power has used sectarianism, but strategies differ. Saudi 
Arabia played a key role in fostering Sunni sectarianism, seeking to exploit the 
demographic majority of the Sunni world against Iran by depicting the Shia as a 
heretical minority and Iran’s role as non-Arab interference in the Arab world. Iran’s 
Pan-Islamic discourse tried to re-frame the issue as Muslim resistance against the West 
and its regional collaborators (i.e. Saudi Arabia). While Saudi Arabia exploited Salafist 
proxies, Iran mobilized trans-national Shia clerical networks. The greater divisions 
within the Sunni world (e.g. secularists vs. Islamists, Sufi vs. Salafi, Saudi vs. Qatari, 
Erdogan’s Turkey vs. al-Sisi’s Egypt) compensated for the Shia’s demographic 
inferiority. 
 
Sectarian Bi-polarization: 
  These factors stimulated a powerful cumulative tendency to bi-polarize the 
region between Sunni and Shia sectarianism in which the moderate secular center was 
being squeezed out. This was paralleled by radicalization within each of the two 
confessions: within Sunnism, the normative balance has shifted away from the 
previously majority non-violent versions that accepted co-existence, notably Sufis 
whose “everyday’ sectarianism” was non-political and accommodationist with secular 
authorities and other sects. Sufism suffered from the rise of Salafist fundamentalism, 
which, particularly in failed states such as Syria, easily slips into jihadism. At the same 
time, the modernists of the Muslim Brotherhood brand struggled to sustain their 
discourse on a civil state, squeezed between regimes’ repression and jihadi 
mobilization. Within Shiism, too, politicized militias, composed of zealots ready for 
martyrdom in defence of Shia shrines and neighbourhoods, joined the fighting in Syria 
and Iraq. This has shifted the normative balance within Islam away from co-existence 
and toward takfiri practices (claiming other Muslims are apostates or infidels).   
 This is not to say that this bi-polarization is uncontested or necessarily 
permanent. Class, local and tribal identities crosscut sectarianism and civic identities 
compete with it. People have many identities and the embrace of sect is a function of the 
current violent conflicts and its instrumentalization in the regional power struggle.  
 
Conclusion 
What began as a variant of the struggle for regional hegemony between powers aligned 
with and against U.S. intervention in Iraq, framed in familiar Arab-Islamic terms 
(resistance), has been transformed by the Arab uprising into an unprecedented 
sectarian bi-polarization of the regional system. Sectarian bi-polarization in the inter-
state power struggle was paralleled by a shifting normative balance away from 
moderates within both Shia and Sunni Islam and by polarizations splitting several 
identity-fragmented Arab states apart.  
 Why has this sectarian diffusion so swiftly achieved near-hegemony in the wake 
of the Arab uprisings? Part of the answer is the instrumentalization of sectarianism in 
the intense – even existential – power struggles unleashed by the uprising. Inside states, 
warring patrimonial regime remnants and opposition charismatic movements draw on 
the historically successful “Khaldounian” practices to build power: in multi-sectarian 
societies sectarianism is understood to work in generating asabiyya, mobilizing followers 
and demonizing enemies. This could be seen as authoritarian learning: drawing on 
extensive past repertories widely available in regional memories to address new 
episodes of state formation/deformation. At the trans-state level, competition for 
leadership within sects promotes outbidding by radical sectarian entrepreneurs that 
marginalizes moderates, a successful practice then widely emulated, which deepens 
sectarianism. Similarly, in regional level power struggles, rival states emulate each 
other in what might be called “tit for tat sectarianism”– when one side frames the 
struggle in sectarian terms, its success leads its rivals to similarly respond.  
 But what makes this instrumentalization of sectarianism – which before the 
uprising had, outside of Iraq, quite limited success – so potent? First, the widespread 
weakening of states has made them much more permeable than hitherto to the diffusion 
of sectarianism by extensive previously-existing transnational linkages – discourses of 
preachers, activist networks and armed movements. Second, the unprecedented level of 
competitive intervention by rival regional powers in failed states results in proxy wars 
funded and armed by kindred sectarians. Third, in failing states civil war violence and 
security dilemmas transforms identities in a sectarian direction at the expense of more 
inclusive ones. Thus, similar structural factors (state failure, civil war) combined with 
trans-state penetration, emulation, and intervention make states and populations 
susceptible to unparalleled sectarian diffusion.  
 The change of dominant identities used in the regional power struggle from 
supra-state ones to sectarianism profoundly impacts the conduct of politics. The 
previous dominance of Arabism contributed to the integration of Arabic speaking 
religious minorities within states and enjoined the Arab states to cooperate at the 
regional level. By contrast, the current version of radical sectarianism prescribes 
uncompromising jihad within the Islamic umma against heresy. In this Sunni-Shia bi-
polarization of the region all people and states are pushed to take sides. This intensified 
regional power struggle waged by sectarian discourse and proxy wars is plunging the 
Middle East into a new dark age.  
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